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The Supreme Court is currently in retreat from libertarian constructions of the rights of individuals and minorities. Ironically, this retreat coincides with the bicentenary of the bill of Rights, drafted and debated in 1789 and ratified in 1791. No less ironic, political opposition to the Court's previously broad construction of those guarantees has been inspired by what is called the "Madisonian dilemma."I Simply put, the dilemma is one of allowing majorities to govern while also safeguarding the rights of minorities. The Court's critics argued that majoritarianism was central to the "Madisonian system," and therefore judicial review ought to be sharply limited in deference to legislative majorities. The Warren and the Burger Courts' rulings striking down state laws in defense of individual rights were thus attacked for being countermajoritarian.2 Opposition to their rulings is now internalized within the Court itself, due to changes in its composition and the emergence of a solid conservative bloc on the Rehnquist Court. 3 The problem of the Court's institutional role is not new. But, the "Madisonian dilemma" gave it a new twist and "set the terms shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process." 11 Except when the government is literally forbidden by the Constitution from legislating on specific matters, in Justice Scalia's view, the meaning of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights should be determined not by the Court but by the forces of majoritarian democracy in state legislatures. 12 In Justice Scalia's words:l3
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Although not drawing the same conclusions as Justice Scalia, even defenders of libertarian rulings of the Warren Courts, including Jesse Choper,l4 John Ely,1s and Michael Perry,l6 have taken the "Madisonian dilemma" for granted in their ill-fated attempts to reconcile judicial review and majoritarian democracy. 11 Not everyone, to be sure, has been deceived by that formation of the Court's problem. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., for one, countered that, "Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another. Those who drafted our Constitution understood the difference. One cannot read the text without admitting that it embodies substantive choices; it places certain values beyond the power of any legislature."ls No less eloquently, Justice Robert Jackson observed that,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 19 Still, the "Madisonian dilemma" has dominated contemporary de- bate and suggested a "majoritarian paradigm"2o for the Rehnquist Court's construction of constitutional law.
The "Madisonian dilemma" has been misleading in many ways, not only in debates over the Court but also in writing about the Framers' Muse, James Madison. Whether or not the "republican revival"2J in constitutional scholarship contributes to reorienting debate over the Court, Madison's theory of republicanism merits re-examination. My aim here, however, goes beyond simply showing that the "Madisonian dilemma" as constructed by Bickel and Bork is unfaithful to Madison's political vision. As a genuinely original political thinker and one of the chief architects of the Constitution, Madison developed a unique theory of republicanism and a novel theory of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to Bickel and Bork, republican liberty, not majoritarianism, lies at the heart of the Madisonian system. Indeed, Madison was convinced that republican liberty was primarily threatened by popular majorities and legislative majorities in both Congress and the states. For that reason, he redefined republicanism, endeavoring to combine the institutions of representative government with auxiliary precautions for the rights of individuals and minorities. Far from rendering the Court a "deviant institution," Madison laid a basis for the Court's role in defending republican liberty. Madison anticipated and rejected a "jurisprudence of original intentions," and articulated instead a theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism.
I. MADISON'S REPUBLIC "Who are the Best keepers of the People's Liberties?"22 No less than today, that question was widely debated during the Founding. Madison posed it in a dialogue between a Republican and an Anti-republican, published anonymously a year after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The short answer for the Republican was:23
The people themselves. The sacred trust can be no where so safe as in the hands most interested in preserving it. By contrast, the Anti-republican responded:
20.
The people are stupid, suspicious, licentious. They cannot safely trust themselves. When they have established government they should think of nothing but obedience, leaving the care of their liberties to their wise rulers.
At that, the Republican countered:
Although all men are born free ... yet too true it is, that slavery has been the general lot of the human race. Ignorant-they have been cheated; asleqr-they have been surprised: divided-the yoke has been forced upon them. but what is the lesson?
123
The lesson Madison drew was that republicanism presumed a "people [who were] enlightened ... awakened ... [and] united" in watching over the watchmen. Republican liberty ultimately depended on a people who cared about res publica, the public thing. Yet, according to Madison, the people themselves posed the greatest threat to republicanism. And that created a real dilemma for Madison, because he championed republican liberty, popular selfgovernment, first and foremost. "What a perversion of the natural order of things," as he observed through the words of the Republican, "to make power the primary and central object of the social system, and Liberty but its satellite. "24 Madison's republicanism took a distinctively American form, based on a faith in reason and a libertarian dedication to safeguarding the rights of individuals and minorities from the oppressive forces of majoritarianism.
"Republicanism" was the watchword of the Founding period.2s It stood for popular sovereignty, in Montesquieu's words, for a government in which "the body or only a part of the people is possessed of supreme power. "26 Still, there was wide disagreement over what it entailed. Like "federalism," "state sovereignty" and much else, the meaning of "republicanism" was if anything less clear and more divisive than today.21 During the Founding, political discourse was ambiguous and in flux. Madison's contribution to the conceptual change in the understanding of "republicanism" was unique. His republicanism presumed that nature-that is, individuals' self-interests and the conditions of American life-could be improved by political architecture. 30 The latter contains one of his clearest statements of the problems of securing republican liberty. Surprisingly, it neither begins nor ends with a catalogue of the structural and practical problems of the Articles of Confederation. Instead, Madison focuses on state encroachments on federal authority and denial of the rights of individuals and minorities. The "multiplicity," "mutability," and "injustice" of state laws were "more alarming," because they brought "into question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights."3I According to Madison, the denial of individual rights by legislative majorities was at the root of the crisis in republicanism in the 1780s.
In Vices, and throughout his career, Madison was preoccupied with safeguarding "the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals" against oppression by popular majorities, whether operating through the legislative process in Congress or the states. 32 Unrestricted rule by popular majorities struck "at the very heart of republicanism"33 by denying the possibility of governance by a "constitutional majority. "34
Republican liberty, including the rights and interests of individuals and minorities, was endangered by the influence that popular majorities had, "1. in the Representative bodies, 2. in the people themselves."3s In Vices and elsewhere, he complained that representatives in Congress and state legislatures failed to pay "fidelity to 28 . Letter Madison's solution to the problem of republicanism was neither simple nor entirely shared by his contemporaries. It sprang in part from deconstructing the traditional understanding of republicanism. First, Madison doubted that elected representatives and popular majorities could be reliably restrained by considerations of either the civic "good of the Community" or personal character and reputation; appeals to religion were even more problematic.41 Second, he rejected Montesquieu's teaching that republican forms of government were possible only in small territories. In his Vices, during the convention, and later in the Federalist, he advanced his well-known argument for republicanism based on a large extended republic. 42 When introducing in Vices the idea that "the enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights,"43 Madison aims to show how oppression by popular majorities might be minimized. In an extended and populous territory, "common interests or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combina- For strategic reasons, Madison did not touch upon the idea that the states might themselves be "extended republics" in the Federalist. When differentiating republicanism from "a pure democracy"so in Federalist Number 10, Madison does so in language reminiscent of that in Vices and equally applicable to curbing popular majorities within each state as well as the nation. "The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are," in his words, "first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which 44 the latter may be extended."s1 Both were crucial and interdependent. The first, one of political design, bears on the Constitution's creation of a representative form of government and system of institutional checks and balances. The second, Madison's "naturalist" argument, is the one stressed in Federalist Number 10. Referring to the utility of an economy of scale in terms of population and territory, Madison observes:s2
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficulty for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.
This "advantage which a republic has over a democracy," he notes, "is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it."s3 Although not pressing the point here, Madison recognized that this advantage was also one that republican governments in large states had over those in small states. Instead, Madison concludes Federalist Number 10 with the hope that though "factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States ... [they] will be unable to spread a general conflagration throughout the other States. "s4
One of Madison's distinctive contributions to republicanism was his "naturalist" argument. No less critical, though, was his thought about the architectural design of governmental institutions. Representative government required additional institutional checks and balances or, as he referred to them elsewhere in the Federalist, "auxiliary precautions."ss In a well-known passage in Federalist Number 51, Madison highlights their importance when asking "what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?"s6
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing government, which is to be administered by men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. [of a large and populous republic] ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. "57 How far Madison distanced the institutions of republican government from majoritarianism is underscored in Federalist Number 39. There, he again distinguishes the Constitution's creation from democratic and other kinds of regimes. In a republican form of government, "[i]t is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it."5s This feature of republicanism distinguishes the Constitution from "mixed regimes," such as that in England, and from aristocratic and monarchic regimes. It was even further removed from majoritarian democracy by Madison's observation that It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified [that is, popularly elected representatives, who hold "their offices during pleasure for a limited behavior"]. 59
Again, in Federalist Number
Distinguishing between republicanism and majoritarian democracy in this way points towards Madison's resolution of the problem with republicanism. The Constitution created a system of representative government in which the "political and constitutional majority [governs] in contradistinction to a numerical majority of the people."60 In the Madisonian system, the governing constitutional majority is necessarily a numerical minority when compared with the more numerous and popular majority within the states. Still, in large and populous territories, government by a constitutional majority, subject to the auxiliary precautions of institutional checks and balances, was the only way Madison deemed republican liberty might be secured against majoritarianism in the states and the nation.
While defending the Constitution in the Federalist, Madison concealed deep disappointment with the document. The Constitutional Convention failed to embrace all of the auxiliary precautions demanded by his vision of republicanism. The "excesses of democracy"6t were insufficiently curbed to ensure the "genius of republican liberty."62 Although the Convention agreed to the supremacy 57 Unfortunately, from Madison's perspective, the Constitutional Convention rejected both proposals for checking legislative majorities in Congress and the states. Less than two weeks before the Constitutional Convention adjourned, Madison complained to Thomas Jefferson that the Constitution would "neither effectively answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts against the state governments. 10 In another letter to Jefferson the following year, he renewed the complaint that "parchment barriers" inadequately dealt with the underlying threat to republican liberty. That threat arises from the people, "not from acts of the Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents . . . This is a truth of great importance," which, Madison lamented, was "not yet sufficiently attended to."7t
Madison's republicanism is richer and more complex than Bickel and Bork contend. Popular majorities, legislative majorities, and majoritarian democracy were far more troubling for Madison than they concede. At the heart of the Madisonian system was republican liberty, not majoritarianism. Madison reconstructed republican theory in light of the American experience and demand for popular and representative government. He did so in ways that retained republicanism's association with ultimate popular sovereignty, while disassociating it from majoritarianism in the normal operation of government. His "naturalist" argument for how large and populous territories might augment the benefits of representative government made republicanism more agreeable. Still unsatisfied, Madison sought auxiliary institutional precautions against the oppressive majoritarianism in Congress and in the states. At virtually every turn, he limited majoritarianism in defense of republican liberty. That is why Madison despaired at the Constitutional Convention's refusal to grant a national veto over state laws and to provide an additional check on legislative majorities within Congress. provlSlon .
which gives an appellate supremacy to the judicial department of the United States."n II. MADISON AND "PARCHMENT BARRIERS"
Though drafting and introducing in the First Congress the amendments that eventually became the Bill of Rights, Madison was at best a reluctant supporter of what he considered "the nauseous project of amendments. "73 He resisted the project for several reasons. First, the Constitutional Convention's objective was strengthening, not weakening, the national government. And at the convention he had unsuccessfully pressed for additional institutional safeguards for republican liberty. Second, he tended to agree with James Wilson74 and Alexander Hamilton7s that since the national government was limited to exercising expressly delegated powers, it had no power to legislate on such matters as religion and the press. In addition, as late as 1788 he opposed Anti-federalists' demands because he worried that amendments would only complicate the ratification battle. Finally, he doubted that "declarations on paper" would be "an effective restraint."76 "[I]n a Government of opinion like ours," the most effective safeguard was the "soundness and stability of the general opinion on the subject. "77 Madison shared the view expressed by John Mercer toward the end of the convention that, "[i]t is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the United States. It is the men whom it will bring into the government and interest in maintaining it that is to govern time. The paper will only mark out the mode and form. Men are the substance and must do the business."7s
Madison's initial position, however, did not disparage republican liberty or a declaration of rights in favor of legislative majorities. Quite the contrary. At the Constitutional Convention, as noted, he pressed for a national veto over state laws and a council of revision in order to guard against the denial of individual rights by the states and Congress. In 1785, when offering advice on a constitution for Kentucky, he likewise endorsed the creation of a council of revision and the incorporation of provisions expressly restraining the state legislature from "meddling with religion-from abolishing Juries, from taking away the Habeas corpus-from forcing a citizen to give evidence against himself, from controuling the press. "79 "Experience and refiection"8o led Madison to reconstruct republicanism. So too, he was later led to embrace parchment guarantees for republican liberty. In December 1787, Jefferson wrote him complaining about "the omission of a bill of rights."81 That was the first of several letters contributing to his change in thinking. But, Madison's own political fate in 1788 was important as well. The Anti-federalists' opposition to the Constitution over the omission of a declaration of rights became increasingly worrisome. By June of 1788, the Anti-federalists were campaigning for a second constitutional convention. That prospect disturbed Madison, as did two votes that June in Virginia's state ratifying convention. The Anti-federalists' call for conditional amendments was defeated by a vote of 88 to 80, and the Constitution ratified by an 89-to-79 vote. Yet, the closeness of those votes moved Madison to publicly endorse a declaration of rights. Then, the Virginia legislature refused to elect him to a seat in the United States Senate. He was outmaneuvered by Patrick Henry's attack on the sincerity of his promise to push for amendments in Congress.82 With his subsequent election to the House of Representatives, Madison was fully converted to the adoption of amendments. Still fearing the possibility of a second constitutional convention, he vowed to introduce amendments because that was "the most expeditious mode ... [and] the safest mode. "83
In July 1788, Jefferson again wrote Madison about the urgency of adopting a declaration of rights, but the letter failed to arrive until October 15.84 Two days later he responded with an extraordinary one of his own, explaining he had "always been in favor of a bill of rights" and yet "never thought the omission a material de- fect."s' Madison gave four reasons for his ambivalence. First, he accepted the Federalists' argument that "the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted." Second, he feared "that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." In particular, "the rights of Conscience" might be narrowed by any formal-legal definition. Third, republican liberty was guarded against Congress by its constitutionally "limited power" and "the jealousy" of the states. Finally, he maintained that "experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed. "s6
Madison did not view a declaration of rights in a more "important light" primarily because of his theory of republicanism. In a monarchy, such guarantees might have "great effect, as a standard for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing & uniting the superior force of the community."s7 But, republicanism rested on popular sovereignty; in the end political power resided with the majority of the people. What use then, he rhetorically asked, would a declaration of rights have in a republic?
His answer was two-fold and indicated a further refinement of his theory of republicanism. Republican liberty, he reiterated, "is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."ss A declaration of rights might educate and unite the people in support of republican liberty. "The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion."89 Moreover, Madison now conceded that, in the event of an abusive government, a declaration of rights might serve "as a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community."90 Basically, Madison came to favor a declaration of rights because of the wide-spread demand for it and because of its potential "to impress some degree of respect for [its guarantees and] to establish public opinion in their favor."9I He had yet to connect a decla- ration of rights and the kinds of institutional checks and balances he pushed for during the Constitutional Convention. On receiving his letter, however, Jefferson immediately responded by pointing out the omitted argument, "which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."92 Persuaded, Madison finally made a connection between a declaration of rights and the role of the Court. Three months later he relied on that argument in the House of Representatives when introducing his proposed amendments:93
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Still, in spite of that grand oration and instead of expanding on the Court's role, Madison concentrated on turning the four principal arguments against such additions into good republican arguments for their adoption.
Madison's main arguments in the House of Representatives, again, registered his commitment to republican liberty and distrust of majoritarianism. It had been argued that a declaration of rights was unnecessary because no such declaration existed in England. Never an Anglophile, Madison objected to the comparison (one that Justice Scalia now finds so attractive).94 England was not "wholly republican." Parliament's legislative power was "indefinite," and thus a constant threat to republican liberty. The Magna Carta, moreover, stood as a barrier only against the Crown and contained no guarantee for " [t] he freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people. "9s Conceding that parchment barriers were weak, Madison observed that "they may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power"96 by inspiring public opinion and the support of the judiciary.
Madison also now found inconclusive the Federalist argument that a declaration was unnecessary because the national government was limited to only enumerated powers. He countered that Congress had vast uncertain powers under the Necessary and Proper 92. Letter 84 . A declaration of rights, claimed Hamilton, was "not only unnecessary ... but would even be dangerous" in defining exceptions to powers not granted and leaving "the utmost latitude of evasion." too Admitting that was "one of the most plausible arguments" against amendments, Madison responded by directing attention to his proposal which later became embodied in the ninth amendment.tot It provided that, "[t]he exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people."to2
Madison's defense of what became the ninth amendment reflected Jefferson's influence. Madison had once feared "that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude."to3 But, Jefferson reassured him that, "[h]alf of a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let's secure what we can." Jefferson moved Madison to view a declaration of rights as another auxiliary measure, which put into "the hands of the judiciary" an additional check on the coercive power of legislative majorities. "This is a body," Jefferson had observed, "which is rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits great confidence for their learning and integrity."t04
Though converted to defending a declaration of rights, That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purpose of its institution.
The people are sovereign and ultimately "the best keepers"tos of republican liberty. Rather than embracing majoritarianism in the normal operation of government, Madison thereby aimed to reaffirm that, in the event of an oppressive government, the people might undertake constitutional reforms, either through the amendment processt09 or subversion of the government. Yet, so long as the Constitution remained in place, the "constitutional majority" it created governed. Republican liberty, Madison remained convinced, was more likely to be secured through representative government, as constrained by auxiliary precautions and as augmented by the benefits of large and populous territories. Still, if this experiment in constitutional government failed, he never doubted the ultimate power of the people to revise or abandon the Constitution.
How were his ill-fated proposals to bar Congress and the states from denying the "full and equal rights of conscience."Iw Because in the 1780s Madison held state legislative majorities to constitute a greater danger than Congress, he considered his proposal denying states the power to "infringe on the equal rights of conscience" to be "the most important amendment on the whole list." 111 Later in the 1790s, when opposing the national government's censorship of the Democratic Societies and enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Madison deemed Congress a more serious threat.II2 Although wavering on whether the major threat to republican liberty came at the national or state level, Madison remained steadfastly convinced that the threat originated with the people, "not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."II3 What finally emerged from the First Congress and was ratified as the Bill of Rights disappointed Madison, once again. Congress rejected his plan for inserting the amendments into the document itself; he feared that those declarations of republican liberty might be dismissed as less important than the Constitution itself. In addition, like the Constitutional Convention, Congress rejected his proposal for sharply checking the powers of the states. As historian Jack Rakove puts it, "the most Madisonian element of the Constitution is arguably the fourteenth amendment, which was, of course, adopted a full three decades after his death."II4
Ill. MADISON ON THE SUPREME COURT AND PRAGMATIC INTERPRETIVISM
Madison's appreciation for the Court's role in protecting republican liberty at times fell short of what his theory of republicanism could encompass. During the Constitutional Convention, his concern with securing a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions and interests in the State"! IS led him to focus on a national veto over the states. Yet, he favored a national veto by Congress, not the Court. Madison the major role that the Court could play in defending national supremacy and the rights of individuals and minorities. Besides underestimating the Court's power, he worried that states might refuse to comply with its rulings. Moreover, he looked to preventing "injustice" from occurring in the states and Congress. Only after the security of republican liberty has been ruptured, after legislation is challenged through the adjudicatory process, does the Court come into play. In the 1780s, he thus favored alternatives to relying on the Court. It was "more convenient to prevent the passage of law, than to declare it void after it is passed."116 Also, he noted, individuals might not be financially able to appeal to the courts. Madison's republicanism, nevertheless, laid a foundation for the Court's protection of the rights of individuals and minorities. His advocacy of a national veto led directly to the adoption of the Supremacy Clause. The original jurisdiction granted in article III,m and the appellate jurisdiction given in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, us expressly recognize the Court's role in defending national supremacy and republican liberty against the states.
In Central to understanding the role the Court came to play in Madison's theory of republicanism is the distinction he drew between, on the one hand, the "extreme cases"I23 that arise in a constitutional crisis and, on the other hand, "cases not of that extreme character" which frequently arise in the course of constitutional government.
In the "extreme cases," the vast majority of people hold the ultimate political power. Nor could it be otherwise, since popular sovereignty is the bedrock of republicanism. But, in such cases and in keeping with John Locke's teaching on the right to revolution,I24 Madison cautioned that there could be "no regular Arbiter or Umpire" justifying a "resort to the original rights of the parties to the system."12s With such appeals to simple majoritarianism, to the "extra & ultra constitutional right" of the people, would come the dissolution of the Constitution. Consequently, Madison lamented popular appeals to the majoritarianism.I26 He insistently urged recourse to "the final resort, within the purview" of the Constitution, namely, amending the Constitution through the prescribed method in article V. In the event that the amendment process failed to satisfy, Madison allowed that a final appeal might be made directly to the people "from the cancelled obligations of the constitutional compact, to original rights & the law of self-preservation."I27 By contrast, in the routine controversies arising out of the normal operation of government, Madison considered the Court the "surest expositor of the Constitution."12s As he explained in a letter in 1829, "there is & must be an Arbiter or Umpire in the constitutional authority provided for deciding questions concerning the boundaries of right & power. The particular provision, in the Constitution of the U.S. is the authority of the Supreme Court, as stated in the 'Federalist,' No. 39. "129 In the 1830s, Madison often dwelt on the distinction between the Court and the people as the ultimate arbiter of republican liberty and government. He did so for two reasons. First, growing sectional conflict between the North and the South revived interest in state nullification and his authorship of the Report on the Virginia Resolutions. 1 3o Second, his support of the national bank, and his opposition to Jackson's veto of legislation recharting the bank, also brought charges that he was inconsistent in his view of the Constitution. In response to controversies over state nullification and the bank, Madison elaborated his views on the Court and developed his unique theory of constitutional interpretation.
Sectional conflict revived interest in the doctrine of state nullification (that is, that states could nullify federal laws they deemed unconstitutional). other departments of the government; not in the relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial, as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts." 135 Even more than with the Court's assumption of a role in exercising a national veto over state laws, Madison's views matured and sharpened with regard to the Court's role in disputes over the separation of powers. Prior to the Constitution's ratification, Madison argued in the Federalist that "[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers."I36 While not doubting that the Court would "ultimately decide"I3 7 disputes over the constitutional boundaries between the national government and the states, the Court's position relative to Congress and the President appeared more problematic. In a debate during the First Congress, for instance, Madison conceded that "in the ordinary course of Government, ... the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary."IJs Yet, he asked "to know, upon what principle it can be contended, that any one department draws from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the several departments."I39 "Nothing," he insisted, "has yet been offered to invalidate the doctrine, that the meaning of the Constitution may as well be ascertained by the legislative as by the judicial authority."I40
In the 1830s, the controversy over the national bank renewed debate over the authoritativeness of rival interpretations of the Constitution. Madison's contemporaries again questioned his consistency. In December 1790, Hamilton had proposed that Congress charter a national bank. The ensuing debate pitted Hamilton and the Federalists against Madison and Jefferson over fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation and politics. Hamilton persuasively argued that Congress had broad constitutional authority to establish such a corporation.I4I The Senate, half of whose members had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention, unanimously gave its endorsement. But The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.l45 Behind Jackson's veto message was a two-pronged theory. First, he expressly denied that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution had finality, or supremacy over that of the other branches. Second, Jackson maintained that in some areas of constitutional politics the Court simply had no authority to render decisions, while suggesting that in other areas it could do pretty much what it wanted to do. The first prong was (and remains) even more controversial than the second.l46
Jackson's veto message underscores how problematic the Court's role remained fifty years after the Constitutional Convention. In part, it is fair to say, that was due to the Framers' failure to think through the power of judicial review. Though they "anticipated some sort of judicial review," as political scientist Edward S. Corwin observed, "it is equally without question that the ideas generally current in 1787 were far from presaging the present role of the Court."I47 In a letter to Corwin, the noted historian Max Farrand agreed and concluded that "[t]he framers of the constitution did not realize it themselves [how markedly different their conceptions of judicial review were]: they were struggling to express an idea and their experience was as yet insufficient."I4s
Drawn once again into the controversy over the constitutionality of the national bank in the 1830s, Madison responded to charges of "inconsistency between [his] objection to the constitutionality of such a bank in 1791 and [his] assent in 1817." 149 At stake, he said, was "the question of how far legislative precedents, expounding the Constitution, ought to guide succeeding Legislatures and overrule individual opinions."Iso Simply put, the constitutionality of the national "bank had undergone ample discussions" Is I in 1791 and Madison failed to persuade. On the losing side of the controversy in 1791, he later favored the bank and felt obligated as President to sign the recharting legislation into law. From his perspective, "[o]n a simple question of constitutionality there was a decided majority in favor of it."1s2 In other words, by 1817 the bank had operated for over "twenty years with annual legislative recognitions ... and with the entire acquiescence of all the local authorities, as well as of the nation at large."ts3 "[U]nder these circumstances," Madison claimed a veto of the bank bill would have been, as Jackson's veto, in "defiance of all the obligations derived from a course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment and intention."ts4
Madison's reconciliation of his positions on the constitutionality of the national bank reveals his underlying theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism. As other scholars have shown, m Madison had no truck with a "jurisprudence of original intentions," as championed by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. The Constitution, he repeatedly reminded his contemporaries, "was not, like the fabled Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain."ts6 Madison was keenly attune to interpretative problems intertwining the politics of interpretation and the interpretation of politics.m He frequently noted, for example, the temptation to put "glosses"tss on the text and the historical proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,' s9 as well as the limited reliability of such documents as The Federalist.'~ "As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution," he stressed, "the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character."t6t For those reasons, Madison also withheld the publication of his notes on the Constitutional Convention for a half-century, until after his death. Their publication, he explained, was "delayed til the Constitution should be well settled by practice, and till a knowledge of the controversial part of the proceedings of might make a new Constitution, as the foot of every new chancellor would make a new standard of measure."11o Judicial precedents and established legislative practices had "authoritative force in settling the meaning of a law" not only because of Madison's theory of pragmatic interpretativism. He also advanced the utilitarian consideration that "the good of society" required certainty, stability and predictability in the law. 171 Two years before his death in 1836 Madison concentrated specifically on the Court's role in constitutional politics. He reaffirmed that since the Congress, the President, and the Court "are co-ordinate, and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows that each must ... be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own interpretations of it."m However, "notwithstanding this abstract view," Madison now emphasized that the Court "most familiarizes itself to the public attention as the expositor, by the order of its functions in relation to the other departments." He never abandoned his view that Congress and the President might construe the Constitution. But in light of a half-century's experience with the Constitution and the Court, he fully appreciated that in actual practice the Court decides cases and controversies after and in light of the interpretations advanced by Congress and the President. The "ultimate discussion and operative decision,"I73 therefore, comes from the Court because it stands as the final forum for appeals within government itself, short of either amending the Constitution or, worse yet, appealing directly to the people, "that Ultimate Arbiter."I74 Madison concluded that the Court was the "last resort" and "surest expositor" of the Constitution in controversies over both federalism and the separation of powers within the national government. "[W]hen happily filled," as he put it, the Court was "the surest expositor of the Constitution" in controversies "concerning the boundaries between the several departments of Government as in those between the Union and its members."I75 mystery."tso Madison refined the insights originally contained in Vices and elaborated his theory of republicanism in response to the practical problems of securing republican liberty. While publicly defending and privately confessing disappointment with the Constitution, Madison was moved to accept the "parchment barriers" of the Bill of Rights and the Court's role in protecting republican liberty. He reluctantly became "the father of the Bill of Rights." His theory of republicanism accommodated the Bill of Rights and laid a foundation for its defense as a protection of the rights of individuals and minorities.
Madison came to accept a more expansive role for the Court in the 1830s than he anticipated in the 1780s. Admittedly, he did not foresee the full development or potential of the Court. Nor, of course, did he entertain the idea that the Court would be the sole, or even primary, guardian of republican liberty. At times, he also bristled at the Court's intrusion into the domains of Congress and the President. But Madison also harbored both a distrust of majoritarianism in the normal operation of government and a devotion to republican liberty. His unique theories of republicanism and pragmatic interpretativism offer no support for the originalist philosophy advanced by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. Madison never entertained the idea of returning to the English system of parliamentary democracy, in which legislative majorities dominate. The Constitution, as he repeatedly emphasized, stood "without a model, as emphatically sui generis."tst In Madison's view, constitutional controversies found their resolutions in deliberations and adjudications that establish the binding precedents and practices of constitutional government. Because of his pragmatic theory of constitutional interpretation, Madison was convinced that those precedents and practices bound the President, Congress, and the Court, though remaining subject to reversal by formal constitutional amendments. In the end, Madison considered the Court was the "last resort" and "surest expositor of the Constitution" within constitutional government, while still maintaining that the ultimate security for (and ultimate threat to) republican liberty remained with the people.
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